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Note
GLOVER v. STATE: A MISINTERPRETATION AND
MISAPPLICATION OF THE BARKER SPEEDY TRIAL
BALANCING TEST RESULTS IN THE WEAKENING OF A
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A PROMPT TRIAL
In Glover v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether the State of Maryland violated Robert Matthew Glover's right
to a speedy trial under both the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution2 and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.' In a 4-3 decision, the court held that Glover's right to a
speedy trial was not violated because the reasons for the post-arrest
trial delay of fourteen months were mostly neutral and, therefore,
were not unduly prejudicial.4 In reaching its decision, the majority
misapplied the speedy trial analytical framework established by the
United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo.5 The court improp-
erly determined that the unavailability of the State's DNA evidence
was both a valid justification for the first delay and a neutral reason for
the third delay.6 In so doing, the court failed to acknowledge that the
State, by failing to comply with section 10-915 of the Maryland Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article,7 created an inherently unfair situa-
1. 368 Md. 211, 792 A.2d 1160 (2002).
2. The Sixth Amendment states in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution extended the Sixth Amend-
ment's protections of the accused to the judicial proceedings of the states. Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
3. Glover, 368 Md. at 214-15, 792 A.2d at 1162. Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights states:
[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the
accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time
(if required) to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine wit-
nesses for and against him on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury,
without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 21.
4. Glover, 368 Md. at 228, 232, 792 A.2d at 1170, 1172.
5. 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's decision in Barker).
6. Glover, 368 Md. at 226-28, 792 A.2d at 1169-70.
7. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 10-915 (2001). Section 10-915 prescribes the
rules for a party seeking to introduce a DNA profile into evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing. Id. Section 10-915(c)(2) requires a party to provide the opposing party with a first
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tion for Glover, forcing him to choose between going to trial without
adequate preparation or remaining in jail while he reviewed the DNA
discovery materials.8 Moreover, the court failed to accord the proper
weight to the delays caused by the unavailability of judges under the
Barker analysis, which ultimately tipped the scales in the State's favor.9
As a result, the court's decision creates a loophole by which the State
can shirk its duty to provide a criminal defendant with a prompt trial.
I. THE CASE
In February 1998, the body of Charles Scherer was discovered in a
vacant lot in Aberdeen, Maryland."° After conducting an autopsy, a
medical examiner determined the cause of death to be homicide re-
sulting from strangulation and blunt force trauma to the head.11
More than a year later, in February 1999, Robert Matthew Glover was
arrested and charged with the murder.1 2 The State of Maryland in-
dicted Glover in March 1999 for first-degree murder.13 Glover was
subsequently denied bail and, as a result, remained incarcerated for
the entire pretrial process.1 4
In late April or early May 1999, blood samples taken from both
Glover and the victim's clothes were sent to the Maryland State Police
Crime Laboratory for a comparative DNA analysis.15 On June 29,
1999, the police sent the samples to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion's crime laboratory in order to obtain a more detailed analysis.16
The laboratory eventually provided the Harford County Sheriffs Of-
fice with two reports of the DNA test results dated July 7, 1999 and
August 27, 1999.17
The circuit court for Harford County initially scheduled Glover's
trial for July 19, 1999.18 However, five days prior to the scheduled
start of the trial, the prosecution requested a postponement because
generation copy of results, copies of laboratory notes, and laboratory protocols and proce-
dures utilized in the analysis at least thirty days before a criminal proceeding. § 10-
915(c) (2).
8. Glover, 368 Md. at 216-19, 792 A.2d at 1163-64.
9. Id. at 225-28, 792 A.2d at 1168-70.
10. Id. at 215, 792 A.2d at 1162.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 215-16 n.1, 792 A.2d at 1162 n.1.
16. Id.
17. Id. The reports indicated that tests could not exclude Glover as a possible source of
the DNA found on the victim's clothes. Id
18. Id. at 215, 792 A.2d at 1162.
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they had not yet received the DNA reports from the crime labs.' 9 The
trial judge granted the prosecution's request, finding the absence of
the DNA evidence sufficient cause for postponement. 20 Thejudge ad-
ded that postponement was of no real consequence as no judge would
be available for the trial on July 19.21
The circuit court rescheduled Glover's trial for November 1,
1999.22 However, on that date, the court postponed the trial yet again
because of the unavailability of both a judge and jurors. 23 The court
then rescheduled Glover's trial forJanuary 13, 2000.24 The court did
not hold either party responsible for the delay because the delay was
for an administrative reason. Although unable to object to the addi-
tional delay, Glover did openly express that he was not happy with the
postponement. 25
On December 23, 1999, the State finally provided the defense
with a complete copy of the DNA discovery materials.26 Glover moved
to suppress the DNA evidence on January 6, 2000, alleging that the
State failed to comply with section 10-915 (c) (2).27 Glover argued that
the DNA evidence should be suppressed because the State failed to
provide the defense with complete DNA discovery materials at least
thirty days prior to trial.2' The trial judge stated that suppressing the
evidence would be too drastic a remedy. 29 Therefore, instead of
granting the motion to suppress, the judge again postponed the trial,
holding the State responsible for the additional delay.3 ° The judge
then rescheduled the trial for July 17, 2000."'
19. Id.
20. Id. at 215-16, 792 A.2d at 1162-63.
21. The court charged the prosecution for the postponement. Id. at 216, 792 A.2d at
1163. To whom a court charges a postponement is relevant under the Barker speedy trial
analysis as it helps assign responsibility to a party for a particular delay. See Epps v. State,
276 Md. 96, 109, 345 A.2d 62, 71 (1975) (noting that the conduct of the parties is relevant
under the Barker analysis).
22. Glover, 368 Md. at 216, 792 A.2d at 1163.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The DNA test results and serology reports were provided to the defense in
October 1999, but were incomplete due to the lack of laboratory notes that typically ac-
company the test results. Id. at 215 n.1, 792 A.2d at 1163 n.1
27. Id. at 216-17, 792 A.2d at 1163. For an explanation of the DNA discovery require-
ments under section 10-915(c) (2), see supra note 7.
28. Id. at 216, 792 A.2d at 1163.
29. Id. at 217, 792 A.2d at 1163-64.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 218, 792 A.2d at 1164.
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On March 23, 2000, during a hearing to suppress statements
made by Glover to police officers, Glover's attorney reiterated con-
cern over the length of the delay between the trial dates.32 Both the
prosecution and the defense agreed that the July 17 trial date
presented an unreasonable delay in the proceedings.33 In response to
the arguments from both sides, the court moved the trial date forward
to May 1, 2000.34
On April 19, 2000, Glover filed a motion to dismiss his case, as-
serting that his right to a speedy trial under both the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights had been violated. On May 1, 2000, the circuit
court granted the motion to dismiss.36 The court determined the
length of the delay to be presumptively prejudicial, thus warranting
further constitutional scrutiny under the test articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo.37 The court found that the
State ultimately was responsible for the delays because it failed to ad-
here to its obligations during the discovery process, specifically its ob-
ligation to provide the defense with the complete DNA results at least
thirty days before trial.3 8 Furthermore, the court found that Glover
had been prejudiced by the oppressive nature of his pretrial confine-
ment.3 9 Consequently, the trial court dismissed the indictment.
40
The State appealed the decision to the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland, which reversed the trial court's decision. 41 The Court of
Special Appeals found that Glover failed to sufficiently assert his right
to a speedy trial at an earlier time in the pretrial process.42 The court
noted that the first time Glover raised the speedy trial concern was
April 19, 2000, ten months from the date on which his trial was ini-
tially scheduled. The court stated that Glover could have obtained
an earlier trial date by complaining about the date on which the trial
was rescheduled.44 The Court of Special Appeals also stressed that
Glover did not object when the court initially rescheduled the trial
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 218-19, 792 A.2d at 1164.
37. Id. at 219, 792 A.2d at 1164.
38. Id., 792 A.2d at 1165.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 220, 792 A.2d at 1165.
42. Id
43. Id.
44. Id
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from January 13, 2000 to July 17, 2000.45 It was not until the March
23, 2000 suppression hearing that Glover complained about the de-
lay.46 For these reasons, the Court of Special Appeals found that
Glover's right to a speedy trial had not been violated.47
Glover subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land.4" The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether
the Court of Special Appeals had erred in determining that the State
did not violate Glover's right to a speedy trial.4 9
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Maryland, both the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
guarantee the right to a speedy trial.5 ° The Supreme Court has held
that the historical basis for the right to a speedy trial establishes it as
one of the most fundamental rights preserved by the Constitution.5'
The Court has also recognized that the right to a speedy trial is inher-
ently different from all other constitutional rights designed to protect
the accused.52 In addition to protecting against oppressive and un-
warranted pretrial incarceration of the accused, the guarantee of a
speedy trial protects societal interests." The Court has sought to
shield persons accused of crimes from "penalties and disabilities [that
are] incompatible with the presumption of innocence," while at the
same time ensuring effective prosecution of criminal cases.5 4 How-
ever, the vague and amorphous qualities of the right to a speedy trial
have hindered courts in their determinations of precisely when a de-
fendant has been denied this right.55 As a result, the Supreme Court
has rejected rigid tests in favor of a balancing test based on flexible
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Court of Special Appeals noted that "(t]he request, 'Try me today!' is a far
cry from that other request, 'Try me never, because you did not try me yesterday!'" Id.
(quoting RICHARD P. GILBERT & CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 42.3, at 527 (Michie 1983)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See supra notes 2-3 (providing the relevant portions of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights).
51. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
52. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
53. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 4142 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining
the purposes of the Speedy Trial Clause).
54. Id.
55. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 520 (stating that it is difficult to "say how long is too long in a
system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate").
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criteria for determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been
denied.56
A. Supreme Court Case Law Examining the Right to a Speedy Trial
In Klopfer v. North Carolina,5 7 the Court considered whether the
indefinite postponement of prosecution over the objections of the de-
fendant was constitutional.5 ' The State of North Carolina entered a
nolle prosequi with leave after the jury failed to reach a verdict at the
defendant's trial for a misdemeanor criminal trespass charge.59 The
State failed to offer a justification for the indefinite postponement,
despite several objections by the defendant.6 ° The North Carolina Su-
preme Court allowed the indefinite postponement, concluding that
the right to a speedy trial did not protect the defendant from an un-
justified postponement of trial if he was no longer in the custody of
the state.61
The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected the state su-
preme court's conclusion, holding instead that the unjustified post-
ponement of a trial denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial.6 2 The Court reasoned that the indefinite postpone-
ment of the trial had the effect of "indefinitely prolonging [the] op-
pression" the defendant faced in the community as a result of his
pending indictment. 63  Moreover, the Court reaffirmed the Sixth
Amendment's application to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. 64 The Court carefully examined the
56. See id. at 529-30 (rejecting the inflexible approaches of establishing a fixed-time
period in which the defendant must be brought to trial and the demand-waiver rule, re-
quiring the defendant to demand a speedy trial in order to preserve his Sixth Amendment
right).
57. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
58. Id. at 214.
59. Id. at 217. A nolle prosequi "with leave" is a criminal procedure device unique to
North Carolina. Id. at 214. This device is essentially a statement by the prosecuting attor-
ney informing that he does not intend to proceed further with prosecution. Id. Taking a
nolle prosequi discharges the accused from the custody of the state, but does not end the
proceedings against the accused. Id. The prosecuting attorney can petition for nolle prose-
qui "with leave," thereby implying that the proceedings may be continued at a future date.
Id. A nolle prosequi does not dismiss the case; therefore, the statute of limitations remains
tolled. Id.
60. Id. at 217-18. The accused even attempted to ascertain the status of his case by
filing a motion with the court requesting to have the charges pending against him perma-
nently concluded "as soon as [was] reasonably possible." Id. at 218 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
61. Id. at 219.
62. Id. at 221-22.
63. Id. at 222.
64. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
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historical roots of the right to a speedy trial and its implementation
throughout the United States.65 The Court determined the right to a
speedy trial to be one of the most basic rights secured by the Constitu-
tion, and uniformly recognized as such at the time the Constitution
was adopted.66 Thus, the Court justified its applicability to both the
federal government and the states.6 7
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Klopfer in Smith v. Hooey.68 In
Hooey, the Court addressed the issue of whether the State of Texas
denied a federal prisoner his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
when it failed to provide a prompt trial upon the request of the defen-
dant.69 After receiving an indictment in the mail, the defendant re-
quested that Texas provide him with a speedy trial.7° The State
responded with a letter indicating that the defendant could receive a
trial within two weeks of any date on which he could be present for
trial.71 Over the course of the next six years, the defendant continu-
ally requested a trial, but the State made no effort to obtain the defen-
dant's appearance."
The Supreme Court held that the six-year delay was unreasonable
and violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial because the ac-
cused specifically requested a prompt trial.73 The Court reasoned that
even though the defendant was already incarcerated, the delay was
prejudicial because the defendant may lose the opportunity to serve
concurrent sentences, his ability to defend himself may be impaired,
and the presence of an outstanding charge may have a "depressive"
effect.7" Therefore, the Court held that the State had an obligation to
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and are subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223-26.
66. Id. at 225-26.
67. Id. The Court noted that, at the time of the Union's formation, several state consti-
tutions guaranteed the right to a speedy trial, thus, evincing the fundamental nature of the
right. Id. at 225. As an example, the Court cited to the guarantee in the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights. Id. at 225 n.21.
68. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
69. Id. at 375.
70. Id. The defendant was indicted for theft in Texas, while he was a prisoner at Ft.
Leavenworth, Kansas. Id,
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 383.
74. Id. at 378-79.
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make a "diligent, good-faith effort" to bring an accused to trial upon
request. 75 Dismissing the State's argument that it lacked the power to
bring an out-of-state prisoner to trial, the Court declared that the
right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment "may not
be dispensed with so lightly."76
Similarly, in Dickey v. Florida,7 the Supreme Court considered
whether the State of Florida denied an accused his right to a speedy
trial when he was tried and convicted eight years after the alleged
crime occurred. 78 A few days afterJune 28, 1960, when the defendant
allegedly robbed a motel, he was arrested on separate federal bank
robbery charges. 79 The defendant was then removed from Florida
and placed in the federal prison system.8 0 Over the next seven years,
he attempted to secure a prompt trial in Florida on the state robbery
charge, but the State failed to schedule his trial until January 31,
1968.81
In analyzing the speedy trial claim, the Court determined that the
defendant was available to the prosecution during the seven-year pe-
riod before the trial took place and that the defendant made repeated
motions requesting to be tried promptly.8 2 In addition, the Court ob-
served that the right to a speedy trial is not an abstract notion, but is
instead founded on the genuine necessity that criminal charges
promptly be examined.83 Therefore, the Court reaffirmed the State's
duty to provide an accused with a prompt trial when requested. 84 Be-
cause the State of Florida ignored the accused's repeated requests and
failed to offer valid justification, the Court found that his right to a
speedy trial had been violated.85
In Barker, the Supreme Court created a constitutional framework
for analyzing whether an individual has been denied his Sixth Amend-
75. Id. at 383.
76. Id.
77. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
78. Id. at 30.
79. Id. at 31. While the defendant was detained in the Jackson County jail, a county
sheriff's deputy secured an arrest warrant charging him with armed robbery. ld, at 32.
80. Id. at 32. After the defendant was removed from the Florida criminal justice sys-
tem, the local sheriffs office made no effort to serve the warrant or gain custody of the
accused for trial. Id.
81. Id. at 32-35.
82. Id. at 36.
83. Id. at 37.
84. Id. at 38.
85. Id. at 37-38. The Court did point out that crowded dockets, unavailability ofjudges
and lawyers, and other factors may cause "inevitable" delays. Id. at 38.
[VOL. 62:573
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ment right to a speedy trial.8 6 Finding an ad hoc balancing test to be
the proper analytical approach, the Court identified four factors ap-
propriate in considering speedy trial claims: (1) the length of the de-
lay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) whether the defendant has
asserted his speedy trial right, and (4) the prejudice to the defen-
dant. 7 Among these factors, the Court established the length of the
delay as the triggering mechanism for a speedy trial claim. 8 The
Court noted that the "imprecision of the right to a speedy trial" pre-
cludes establishing a bright-line rule for when a delay becomes pre-
sumptively prejudicial.89 Instead, the Court reasoned that the inquiry
into the length of a delay depends upon "the peculiar circumstances
of the case." 90
In discussing the reasons the Government may offer to justify a
delay, the Court determined that different weights should be ac-
corded to different reasons.9" The Court indicated that a deliberate
attempt to delay proceedings should weigh more heavily against the
prosecution than a "more neutral" reason such as an overcrowded
docket.92 In addition, the Court emphasized that the accused has no
duty to bring himself to trial-that responsibility rests entirely with the
prosecution.93 However, the Court noted that a defendant's assertion
of his right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight,
and conversely, the failure to assert the right may render it difficult to
prove the right was violated.94 Moreover, a court must take into con-
sideration the defendant's interests that the right to a speedy trial is
designed to protect.95 The Court ultimately explained that courts
86. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-34 (1972).
87. Id. at 530. The Court noted, however, that these four factors are not exclusive and
that other courts are free to consider additional factors. Id
88. Id. The length of the delay constitutes both the triggering mechanism and a factor
in the balancing test. Unless a court finds a delay to be presumptively prejudicial, it is
unnecessary to address the other factors in the balancing test. Id
89. Id
90. Id. at 530-31.
91. Id. at 531.
92. Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
A deliberate attempt to delay a trial in order to hamper the defense should be
weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence
or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility rests with the government .... A
valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. Id at 531-32.
95. Id. at 532. The Court stated that those interests are "to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration .. .to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused ... [and] to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired." Id
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must balance these four factors while keeping in mind that a defen-
dant's right to a speedy trial is "specially affirmed in the
Constitution."96
In Doggett v. United States,17 the Court further stated that official
negligence on the part of the Government in bringing a defendant to
trial compounds over time.9" In Doggett, the defendant was indicted
on federal drug charges, but fled the country before he could be ar-
rested."9 The defendant subsequently re-entered the country, and was
arrested, nearly eight-and-a-half years after the indictment against him
was filed."° The Supreme Court found that the delay was a result of
the Government's negligence and, therefore, violated the defendant's
right to a speedy trial.1"1 The Court reasoned that even though negli-
gence is weighted less than deliberate attempts to delay a trial, it none-
theless constitutes an unacceptable reason for delaying a criminal
prosecution that is underway.10 2 In addition, the Court explained
that tolerance for official negligence under the Barker balancing test
ultimately depends on the length of the delay and its subsequent ef-
fect on the fairness of the trial.10 3
In Strunk v. United States,"°4 the Supreme Court considered the
remedy to be applied to deprivations of the right to a speedy trial. 105
Prior to his trial in a United States district court, the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was denied.0 6 At trial, the
defendant was found guilty of transporting a stolen automobile across
state lines. 10 7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that the defendant's right to a speedy trial had
been denied, but held that dismissal of the charges would be too ex-
treme a remedy in this case.'08 Instead, the court remanded the case
with instructions to reduce the defendant's sentence "in order to com-
pensate for the unnecessary delay."' 0 9
96. Id. at 533.
97. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
98. Id. at 657.
99. Id. After two years had passed, no effort was made to locate the defendant. Id. at
649-50.
100. Id. at 650.
101. Id. at 657-58.
102. Id. at 657.
103. Id.
104. 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
105. Id. at 435.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 434-35.
108. Id.
109. Id. The reduction in sentence ordered by the court was 259 days, the length of
delay between the defendant's indictment and arraignment. Id.
582 [VOL. 62:573
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The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the right to a speedy
trial is unlike the other guarantees in the Sixth Amendment because it
is not as easily remedied once it is violated."' 0 The Court explained
that the right to an impartial trial, notice of charges, and compulsory
service, for example, "can ordinarily be cured by providing those guar-
anteed rights in a new trial.""'  The constitutional guarantee of a
speedy trial, however, acknowledges that an extended delay subjects
the defendant to emotional stress resulting from the uncertainties of a
trial.' 12 The Court concluded that the only remedy for this particular
kind of harm, as noted in Barker, is the dismissal of the charges." 3
Although the Court felt dismissal was an "unsatisfactorily severe rem-
edy," it held that it was "the only possible remedy" for deprivations of
the right to a speedy trial."
14
B. Court of Appeals of Maryland Case Law Examining the Right
to a Speedy Trial
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has decided several cases ad-
dressing an individual's right to a speedy trial under both the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. In Erbe v. State," 5 the defendant as-
serted that a five-year delay between his conviction and his sentencing
violated his right to a speedy trial." 6 The court assumed arguendo that
sentencing is part of the trial for analyzing violations of the Sixth
Amendment and Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights."' The court
stated that the language guaranteeing the right to a speedy trial in the
Maryland Declaration of Rights is "virtually identical" to that in the
Sixth Amendment and, therefore, the court's "discussion of the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial [was] equally applicable to the
right provided in the Declaration of Rights, Art. 21. 'q18 The court
applied the Barker balancing test to the delay in this case." 9 The court
noted that the delay between the defendant's conviction and sentenc-
ing was unintentional. 20 In addition, the court found that the defen-
110. Id. at 438-39.
111. Id. at 439.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 440.
114. Id. at 439-40 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972)).
115. 276 Md. 541, 350 A.2d 640 (1976).
116. Id. at 543, 350 A.2d at 642.
117. Id. at 544, 350 A.2d at 642.
118. Id. at 545-46, 350 A.2d at 643.
119. Id. at 560, 350 A.2d at 651.
120. Id. at 549, 350 A.2d at 646.
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dant suffered no prejudice as a result of the delay. 121 Accordingly, the
court held that the defendant's right to a speedy trial under both the
Sixth Amendment and Article 21 had not been denied. 122
In Epps v. State,123 the court again considered whether the State
denied a defendant his right to a speedy trial when the case was post-
poned to accommodate a tactical decision by the prosecution.1 24 The
trial court allowed for postponement of the trial, over the defendant's
objections. 125 The State eventually tried and convicted the defendant
one year and fourteen days after his arrest. 126 In analyzing the speedy
trial claim, the court found that a delay of one year and fourteen days
from the date of arrest to the date of trial is presumptively prejudicial,
requiring the application of the Barker balancing test.1 27 The court
also reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Barker did not in-
tend to classify overcrowded dockets as simply a "neutral reason" for
excusing a delay.' 21 Stating that it is the responsibility of the State to
bring a defendant to trial, the Epps court determined that trial courts,
along with prosecutors, are obligated to provide defendants with
speedy trials. 1 29 The court found that delays caused by scheduling
problems cannot be classified as "wholly neutral" reasons and thus,
are to be held against the State.'3 ° As a result, the court held that the
defendant's right to speedy trial had been denied.'13
Similarly, in Jones v. State,132 the court addressed whether a defen-
dant's right to a speedy trial was denied when he was not tried until
twenty-nine months after his arrest, despite repeated requests for a
trial. 13 3 The court found that the State was responsible for an eleven-
month delay, which occurred between two other delays of one year
121. Id. at 560, 350 A.2d at 651.
122. Id
123. 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975).
124. Id. at 99-100, 345 A.2d at 66. The prosecution requested a postponement of the
trial in order to try the defendant jointly with a co-defendant. Id at 99, 117.
125. Id
126. Id. at 111, 345 A.2d at 72.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 112, 345 A.2d at 73. The court explained that the Barker decision only sug-
gested that such a cause is a "more neutral reason than a deliberate attempt to delay the
trial in order to hamper the defense." Id. (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531
(1972)).
129. Id. at 114-15, 345 A.2d at 74.
130. Id. In addition, the court noted that the trial court's passive cooperation with the
prosecution contributed to the delays. Id at 121, 345 A.2d at 78.
131. Id at 121, 345 A.2d at 78.
132. 279 Md. 1, 367 A.2d 1 (1976).
133. Id. at 3-6, 367 A.2d at 3-5.
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and of nearly six months, respectively.' Part of the eleven-month
delay resulted from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County's inability
to produce a judge for the trial."3 5 The court determined that the
failure to dispose of the case in a prompt manner caused the defen-
dant actual harm as he may have "suffered needlessly for eleven
months." '136 Thus, the court held that the State denied the defendant
his right to a speedy trial.'17
In Brady v. State, 3' the court considered whether a pretrial delay
of fourteen months resulting from neglect by the State deprived the
defendant of his right to a speedy trial.139 The court found the State
to be negligent in attempting to locate the defendant in order to serve
the indictment. 4 ° At the time, the defendant was incarcerated in a
neighboring municipality's jail.141 In reaching its conclusion, the
court explained that the State was ultimately responsible for the coor-
dination of its criminal divisions in its attempt to locate a defendant
for trial.1 42 The court found the apparent "prosecutorial indiffer-
ence" to be the determinative factor in the case, tipping the scales of
the balancing test in favor of the defendant.143 After failing to iden-
tify a justification favoring the State, the court held that the defen-
dant's right to a speedy trial was violated.' 44
Once more, the court, in Divver v. State, 4 ' considered whether a
delay of one year and sixteen days resulting from the trial court's fail-
ure to schedule the case violated the defendant's right to a speedy
trial.'46 The court found the trial court's lack of activity in the case for
nearly nine months after the defendant's arrest to be the sole reason
for the delay, and thus prejudicial to the defendant.'47 The court re-
134. Id. at 13, 367 A.2d at 9. The court determined the reasons for the other two delays
were either neutral or the fault of the defendant. Id.
135. Id. at 12, 367 A.2d at 9-10.
136. Id. at 18, 367 A.2d at 12.
137. Id.
138. 291 Md. 261, 434 A.2d 574 (1981).
139. Id. at 269-70, 434 A.2d 578-79.
140. Id. at 267, 434 A.2d at 577.
141. Id. at 263-64, 434 A.2d at 575-76. The defendant was incarcerated in the Baltimore
County jail when the Anne Arundel County State's Attorney's Office indicted him on Au-
gust 22, 1977. Id Brady did not learn of the indictment until June 9, 1978, after his re-
lease from the Baltimore County jail. Id
142. Id. at 267, 434 A.2d at 577.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 270, 434 A.2d at 578-79.
145. 356 Md. 379, 739 A.2d 71 (1999).
146. Id. at 381-82, 739 A.2d at 73.
147. Id. at 391, 739 A.2d at 78.
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affirmed that it is the State's obligation to schedule cases for trial. 48
Balancing all the factors of the case, the court concluded that the de-
fendant's right to a speedy trial was violated.149
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Glover, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Court of
Special Appeals's decision that the State did not violate Glover's right
to a speedy trial. 5 Judge Battaglia, writing for the majority, 151 deter-
mined that Glover's post-arrest, pretrial delay was presumptively preju-
dicial, thus, triggering further inquiry under the constitutional
analysis articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker.'
52
Applying the Barker test to the facts of the case, the court explained
that although not determinative, the four factors enunciated in Barker
help to guide the court in its consideration of an "amorphous, fluid,
and unquantifiable" right.1 5
3
Examining the first factor of the Barker test, the court stated that
while the fourteen-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, it was
not inordinate considering the circumstances of the case.' 54 Reason-
ing that the delay caused by the State was not excessive given the com-
plexities of DNA evidence in a murder case, 155 the majority found that
society has a strong interest in rendering just verdicts in cases where a
potential penalty of death or life imprisonment exists. 156 Therefore,
the court determined that exactness of DNA evidence outweighs the
need for expedient murder trials without such evidence. 157
Analyzing the second prong of the Barker test, the court deter-
mined that the delays in the case arose as a result of mostly neutral
148. Id.
149. Id. at 395, 739 A.2d at 80.
150. Glover, 368 Md. 211, 232, 792 A.2d 1160, 1172 (2002).
151. Judge Battaglia's opinion was joined by Judges Raker, Wilner, and Cathell. Id. at
214, 796 A.2d at 1162.
152. Id. at 222, 792 A.2d at 1166-67.
153. Id. at 223, 792 A.2d at 1167; see supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker).
154. Glover, 368 Md. at 223-24, 792 A.2d at 1167.
155. DNA evidence is obtained by using either the polymerase chain reaction test (PCR)
or the restriction fragment length polymorphism test (RFLP). Williams v. State, 342 Md.
724, 744, 679 A.2d 1106, 1117 (1996). RFLP testing is capable of providing a "very specific
match between two samples," while PCR testing can only "narrow down a potential number
of donors in a certain group." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Both tests are de-
signed to identify the type of a specific gene in a given sample. Id at 744 n.6, 679 A.2d at
1117 n.6.
156. Glover, 368 Md. at 224, 792 A.2d at 1168.
157. Id.
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reasons."' s Examining the causes of the first postponement, the un-
availability of a judge for trial, and the unavailability of the.prosecu-
ion's DNA evidence, the court first noted that the unavailability of a
judge was a neutral reason to which it accorded little weight.1 5 9 More-
over, the court concluded that the highly technical nature of DNA
evidence might require more time to process and review than other
types of evidence.1 6' The court found no evidence to suggest that the
State was negligent in coordinating the various criminal divisions, in-
cluding the Maryland State Police Laboratory, necessary for promptly
bringing a defendant to trial.161 Thus, the court concluded that the
unavailability of the DNA test results provided a valid justification for
the first trial delay.162
The court then examined the reason for the second postpone-
ment, which occurred when the Circuit Court for Harford County was
unable to provide a judge or jury for the trial.' 6 ' Although noting
that this situation was "somewhat disturbing" because Glover's trial
had now been delayed on two separate occasions due to the unavaila-
bility ofjudges, the court found the basis for this delay to be neutral as
well.
164
For the third postponement, the court explained that this delay
was due to the prosecution's failure to adhere to the discovery re-
quirements for the introduction of DNA evidence at trial.165 By fail-
ing to provide the defense with a complete DNA report until twenty
days before the third scheduled trial date, the court concluded that
the prosecution failed to meet its obligation to monitor the division
responsible for processing DNA evidence.166 Therefore, the court
found the prosecution solely responsible for the third postpone-
ment.167 However, the court again concluded that the reason for this
delay was largely neutral as there was no indication that the prosecu-
tion had acted in bad faith. 1 68
As to the third factor articulated in Barker, the court found that
the petitioner sufficiently asserted his right to a speedy trial.'69 The
158. Id. at 228, 792 A.2d at 1170.
159. Id. at 225-26, 792 A.2d at 1168-69.
160. Id. at 226, 792 A.2d at 1169.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id at 227, 792 A.2d at 1169.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 227-28, 792 A.2d at 1169-70.
167. Id. at 228, 792 A.2d at 1170.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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court explained that a defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy
trial, depending on its strength and timeliness, often is an indication
that he is suffering prejudice from a lengthy delay. 170 In contrast to
the Court of Special Appeals's finding, the court noted that Glover
twice requested a speedy trial, once in March 1999 and again on April
19, 2000.171 Furthermore, the court stated that the Court of Special
Appeals had mistakenly placed too much emphasis on the fact that
Glover failed to "aggressively assert" his right to a speedy trial after the
third postponement in January 2000, and thus, erroneously assigned
him blame for the third delay. 172 Although the court concluded that
Glover sufficiently asserted his right, the court reiterated that an ag-
gressive assertion of the right to a speedy trial is not itself a determina-
tive factor under Barker.'7
3
In analyzing the fourth Barker factor, the court found that the
delays in the proceedings did not actually prejudice Glover. 174 The
court considered the facts of the case in light of the three harms that
the right to a speedy trial seeks to protect against: (1) oppressive pre-
trial incarceration, (2) the anxiety and concern of the accused, and
(3) the impairment of the accused's defense. 175 Regarding the first
potential harm, the court stated that Glover's pretrial incarceration
was not "inordinate or unduly oppressive" because the trial was
delayed as a result of the parties' "quest" to obtain accurate DNA evi-
dence and the unavailability of judges to hear the case.1 76
Regarding the second potential harm, the court recognized that
a prolonged delay could create anxiety and emotional stress for an
accused.1 7 7 However, the court stated that these "intangible personal
factors" should only prevail if the sole reason the prosecution proffers
for a delay is overcrowded dockets. T7 The court reasoned that be-
cause the delay in this case was primarily due to the prosecution's fail-
ure to attain the DNA materials before the trial dates, rather than
crowded dockets, the fact that Glover may have suffered anxiety and
stress was not sufficient to find in his favor.' 79
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 229, 792 A.2d at 1170.
173. Id.; cf Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1972) (providing that a defendant's
strong assertion of his speedy trial right should be weighted heavily in his favor while the
lack of an assertion should not be held against him).
174. Glover, 368 Md. at 231, 792 A.2d at 1172.
175. Id. at 229, 792 A.2d at 1171 (referencing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 229-30, 792 A.2d at 1171.
178. Id. at 230, 792 A.2d at 1171.
179. Id.
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As to the last potential harm, the court analyzed the effect that
the pretrial delay had on Glover's defense. °80 The court found that
the delay did not impair Glover's ability to present an adequate de-
fense.1 8 ' The court noted that the passage of time has the potential to
weaken both parties' cases.' 8 2 Nevertheless, the court could not find
any evidence indicating that the delay unduly prejudiced the defense,
and was unwilling to presume prejudice because "the delay was not
excessive or inordinate."' 8 3
After balancing the four Barker factors, the court held that the
petitioner's right to a speedy trial had not been violated. 84 Reason-
ing that delays are often the result of the State's efforts to ensure a fair
trial, and that accurate DNA evidence is critical in murder cases where
fairness is of utmost importance, the court was unwilling to penalize
the State for the delays resulting from the preparation of DNA evi-
dence. 185 The court asserted that even though the State was "not as
aggressive" as it could have been in its attempt to prepare the DNA
evidence and bring the case to trial, the delay did not "unduly
prejudice" Glover.' 86 The court concluded that the unique circum-
stances of the case, along with the lack of evidence establishing
prejudice, demonstrated that the State did not violate Glover's right
to a speedy trial.18
7
In his dissent, Judge Harrell argued that the record did not sup-
port the majority's conclusion that the delays in the DNA discovery
process were due to the "inherent complexities of DNA testing."188
He concluded, rather, that the delays in this case were a result of "be-
nign neglect" on the part of the State and its various criminal divisions
in complying with the discovery process.'8 9 Therefore, Judge Harrell
believed that the State was responsible for every postponement in the
case."' 0 Judge Harrell disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the reasons for the postponements were both "neutral and justified"
because he disagreed with the majority's finding that the State acted
180. Id. at 231, 792 A.2d at 1172.
181. Id.
182. Id. The court explained that both prosecution and defense witnesses' memories
may fade over time. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 232, 792 A.2d at 1172.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id at 232-33, 792 A.2d at 1173 (Harrell, J., dissenting). Judge Harrell's dissenting
opinion was joined by Chief Judge Bell andJudge Eldridge. Id. at 232, 792 A.2d at 1172.
189. Id. at 233, 792 A.2d at 1173.
190. Id. at 236, 792 A.2d at 1175.
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in a "diligent manner" in producing the DNA evidence. 191 Accord-
ingly, he concluded that the State denied Glover his right to a speedy
trial and, therefore, the trial judge was correct in dismissing the mur-
der charges.1
9 2
IV. ANALYSIS
In Glover, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that notwith-
standing a fourteen-month pretrial delay, the State did not deny
Glover his right to a speedy trial.1 9 3 In reaching this conclusion, the
court misinterpreted and misapplied two of the four factors of the
Barker balancing test.'9 4 In analyzing whether Glover was deprived of
his right to a speedy trial, the court failed to accurately characterize
the reasons for the delay and consider whether the delay prejudiced
the defendant. Specifically, the court misinterpreted the meaning of
the term "neutral" as originally defined in Barker, and as applied in
later Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of Maryland cases. 95 The
court characterized the unavailability ofjudges as a neutral reason for
the delay and thus, failed to afford due weight to this factor. In addi-
tion, the court determined that the delays resulting from the unavaila-
bility of the prosecution's DNA evidence were justifiable and did not
prejudice Glover.' 9 6 As a result, the court's misinterpretation and
misapplication of the Barker analysis resulted in a decision that signifi-
cantly weakens a person's right to a speedy trial in Maryland.
A. The Court's Misinterpretation and Misapplication of the Term
"Neutral" Weakens the Right to a Speedy Trial in Maryland
The court in Glover misinterpreted the meaning of the term "neu-
tral" in its allocation of the blame assigned to each party for delays
resulting from the unavailability of judges for trial. In the majority's
191. Id. at 236-37, 792 A.2d at 1175.
192. Id. at 237, 792 A.2d at 1175.
193. Glover, 368 Md. at 215, 792 A.2d at 1162.
194. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
195. Id. at 531. The Supreme Court in Barker explained that delays resulting from over-
crowded dockets or negligence on the part of the State are "more neutral reason [s]" than
delays that result from deliberate acts. Id These neutral reasons are not weighted as heav-
ily as intentional delays; however, they should be considered because the State is ultimately
responsible for placing the defendant on trial. Id.; Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 112, 345 A.2d
62, 73 (1975). The Epps court also recognized that in Barker, the Supreme Court chose not
to classify over-crowded dockets as "neutral reasons" in its examination of the prosecution's
justifications for a delay. Id. The Epps court found that the Barker Court merely suggested
the bases for such delays were "more neutral" when compared to intentional delays, noting
that it is the Government's responsibility to bring the defendant to trial. Id,
196. Glover, 368 Md. at 232, 792 A.2d at 1172.
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analysis, the court cited to its decision in Bailey v. State,197 which
adopted the continuum of assigned weights enunciated in Barker.'9 8
In Barker, the Supreme Court recognized that delays resulting from
overcrowded dockets or negligence were "more neutral reason s]"
than intentional delays.199 The Barker Court reasoned that even
though such delays should be weighted less heavily than their inten-
tional counterparts, courts should nevertheless hold such delays
against the Government, who is ultimately responsible for trying a de-
fendant.2"' Similarly, in Epps v. State, the Court of Appeals found that
a delay resulting from "over-crowded [sic] dockets and scheduling
problems" is not an entirely neutral reason because it is the responsi-
bility of both the prosecutors and the courts to protect a defendant's
right to a speedy trial.2" 1 Despite this established precedent, the
Glover court found that the two delays resulting from the unavailability
of judges were "clearly" neutral reasons that "will not weigh" heavily
against the State, in effect, ignoring the distinction between "neutral
reasons" and "a more neutral reason."20 2
This misinterpretation of the term "neutral" significantly weakens
the constitutional protection of the right to a speedy trial in Maryland.
The Glover court's interpretation of "neutral" yields a dismissive treat-
ment of delays that result from the administrative inability of the State
to bring an individual to trial.2 3 In Barker, the Court used the term
"neutral" in a comparative sense to the word intentional, not limiting
its potential application to its literal meaning.20 4 By focusing on the
literal meaning of "neutral" without considering the context in which
it was used, the Glover court failed to apply the proper weight that a
"more neutral" reason for a delay carries in the balancing process of
the Barker analysis. 20 5 Giving insufficient weight to a delay for which
the state is negligent, but ultimately responsible, has the effect of ex-
197. 319 Md. 392, 372 A.2d 544 (1990).
198. Glover, 368 Md. at 225, 792 A.2d at 1168.
199. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
200. Id.
201. Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 114-15, 345 A.2d 62, 74 (1975).
202. Glover, 368 Md. at 226, 792 A.2d at 1168-69.
203. See Brook Dooley, Speedy Trial, 90 GEO. L.J. 1454, 1459 n.1179 (2002) (noting that
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that more neutral reasons for delays should still be
weighted against the Government as it is their responsibility to try the defendant).
204. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972); see Dooley, supra note 203, at 1459
n.1179 (citing cases that have interpreted the Court's meaning of the terms "intentional"
and "neutral").
205. See Epps, 276 Md. at 112, 345 A.2d at 73 (explaining that the Supreme Court sug-
gested that administrative delays were "more neutral reasons" than intentional delays).
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cusing nearly all delays that are not intentional.2 6 Thus, the Glover
court's interpretation and use of the term "neutral" has the ultimate
effect of weakening a defendant's chances of succeeding on a speedy
trial claim.
217
The court's finding that the unavailability of judges was a
"clearly" neutral reason evinces the weakening effect that its misinter-
pretation of the Barker analysis has on the right to a speedy trial in
Maryland. In Divver v. State, the court recently reaffirmed that it is the
obligation of the State to assign cases for trial. 2 8 The Divver court
reasoned that if the State is unable to assign the case to a judge for
trial because the court is understaffed, the State remains ultimately
responsible for the delay.20 9 However, in the Glover court's analysis of
the delays caused by the unavailability of judges, it decided not to
weight these delays heavily against the State. 210 The court's decision
ultimately had the effect of improperly excusing an eleven-month de-
lay, which resulted from the State's inability to find a judge to try
Glover.2 1
Thus, by excusing an unintentional delay caused by the State, the
court's decision in Glover creates a precedent that weakens an individ-
ual's right to a speedy trial in Maryland. Under the Barker balancing
test, the reasons that a state proffers 'to justify a delay are critical fac-
tors in analyzing whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has
been denied.212 Although not dispositive, the reasons for the delay
will more often than not determine the outcome of the balancing test,
particularly when the defendant is unable to establish how the delay
actually prejudiced him. 2 1 The decision in Glover has the potential to
improperly lessen the weight Maryland courts assign to delays result-
ing from official negligence, incompetence, or impotence. Conse-
quently, a defendant will be forced to produce more evidence that
206. By excusing all non-intentional delays caused by the State, the court would dilute
the State's responsibility in bringing a defendant to trial.
207. Jennifer L. Couture, Defendant's Federal and State Constitutional Right to a Speedy Crimi-
nal Trial, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 585, 588-89 (1994) (stating that courts must consider all of
the four interrelated factors in making their determinations of whether a defendant's right
to a speedy trial has been violated).
208. 356 Md. 379, 391, 739 A.2d 71, 78 (1999).
209. Id.
210. Glover, 368 Md. at 226, 792 A.2d at 1168-69.
211. See id. (finding that the delays in the trial were a result of mostly neutral reasons).
212. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
213. Id. at 533 (noting that all the factors, including the reasons for the delay and actual
prejudice, must be considered together); State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 415, 572 A.2d 544,
554 (1990) (finding that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice is not required to pre-
vail on a speedy trial right claim).
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demonstrates the affirmative prejudice he has suffered due to a delay
in order to tip the balancing test in his favor. However, affirmative
prejudice is often difficult to demonstrate; 14 therefore, it will be ex-
tremely difficult for a defendant to prove that his right to a speedy
trial was denied. 5
Accordingly, the Glover court significantly weakens an individual's
right to a speedy trial by failing to accord the proper weight to unin-
tentional delays in the balancing of the Barker factors, thereby lessen-
ing a defendant's chances of prevailing on a speedy trial claim. Thus,
the court's decision significantly dilutes both the Sixth Amendment
and Article 21's guarantees designed to protect individuals from un-
warranted pretrial incarceration.
B. The Delays Due to the Unavailability of the DNA Results
Were Not Justifiable
In Glover, the court found that the delays caused by the State's
failure to provide the defense with complete DNA discovery materials
prior to trial were both justified and neutral.216 This conclusion is
problematic because it excuses the State's failure to provide Glover
with a speedy trial. By failing to adhere to the DNA discovery require-
ments, the State breached its constitutional duty to bring Glover to
trial in a prompt manner. It was this breach that contributed greatly
to the fourteen-month delay.217 By excusing the State's failure to
abide by the discovery requirements, the Glover court failed to balance
this factor in the petitioner's favor, ultimately finding that his right to
a speedy trial had not been violated.
In examining the first delay,218 the court improperly found that
the highly technical nature of DNA evidence excused the State's con-
stitutional duty to provide Glover with a speedy trial.2 9 In Smith v.
Hooey, the United States Supreme Court noted that a State has a con-
stitutional duty to make a "diligent, good-faith effort" to bring that
person to trial.220 In addition, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
214. See Glover, 368 Md. at 229-30, 792 A.2d at 1171 (noting that affirmative prejudice is
difficult to demonstrate because it often deals with intangible personal factors).
215. Id. at 226-28, 792 A.2d at 1169-70.
216. Id. at 226, 792 A.2d at 1169 (noting that the lack of evidence of the State's failure to
act in a diligent manner led to the conclusion that the postponement was neutral and thus
justified).
217. Id. at 223-26, 792 A.2d at 1166-69.
218. This delay was caused by the unavailability of both the DNA evidence and a judge
to hear the trial. Id. at 225-26, 792 A.2d at 1168.
219. Id. at 226, 792 A.2d at 1169.
220. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969).
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Brady v. State found that the State has a duty to coordinate the efforts
of its criminal divisions.22' In Glover, the State breached both of these
duties. At the time of the first trial, the Maryland State Police Labora-
tory had not completed the DNA test results. 2 2 2 Accordingly, it was
the State's responsibility to ensure that the police crime lab had
processed the DNA evidence sufficiently in advance of trial. If the
State had diligently monitored che laboratory, the evidence would
have been ready for the first trial date and a postponement would
have been unnecessary. Furthermore, the highly technical nature of
the DNA evidence does not impact the State's duty to promptly try
Glover.223 Because the first delay resulted from a lack of preparedness
on behalf of the State, the court erred in finding a justification for the
first postponement.
As for the postponement resulting from the State's failure to pro-
vide the defense with the DNA discovery material, the court once
again improperly labeled the reason for the delay as neutral.224 The
State's failure to properly disclose the DNA results to the defense was
on this occasion a breach of section 10-915 of the Maryland Code,
which requires the delivery of the complete DNA results at least thirty
days before trial.225 The State had an additional five months to com-
ply with the discovery requirements after the first postponement in
July 1999, but by December 1999 had yet to meet this obligation.226
This significant breach of duty to comply with the discovery require-
ments is tantamount to negligence. 27 In Doggett v. United States, the
Supreme Court stated that even though official negligence is weighted
less than a deliberate attempt to harm the defense, "it still falls on the
wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable rea-
sons for delaying a criminal prosecution .... 228 Moreover, the
Doggett Court explained that prosecutorial negligence is not "auto-
221. Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 267, 434 A.2d 574, 577 (1981).
222. Glover, 368 Md. at 215, 792 A.2d at 1162.
223. See Hooey, 393 U.S. at 383 (stating that a State must make a "diligent, good faith
effort" to bring an accused to trial).
224. Glover, 368 Md. at 228, 792 A.2d at 1170.
225. Id. at 227-28, 792 A.2d at 1169-70; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (provid-
ing the rules for a party to introduce DNA evidence into a criminal proceeding).
226. Glover, 368 Md. at 216, 792 A.2d at 1163.
227. See id. at 236, 729 A.2d at 1175, (HarrellJ. dissenting). Judge Harrell quoted the
majority's opinion, which explained that the state's duty to bring the defendant to trial
includes "ensuring that critical discovery materials, such as DNA evidence, are properly
monitored and accounted for .... Id. He then concluded that because the State was
ultimately responsible for the delays in complying with the DNA discovery requirements,
the State breached its duty to bring the defendant to trial. Id.
228. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657 (1992).
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matically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate
exactly how it has prejudiced him."229 The State's official negligence
in complying with the DNA discovery requirements, taken with the
other delays, should have been viewed cumulatively by the court as
unjustifiable.
Moreover, in Dickey v. Florida, the Supreme Court stated that "the
right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and
the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial."230 In
Brady v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland also reasoned that the
prosecutor's indifference in trying a defendant tipped "the scales
most heavily in [the defendant's] favor." 2 1 In Glover, the State failed
to afford a prompt trial because of its own inability to comply with the
discovery rules required for the introduction of DNA evidence. 2
32
The State was solely responsible for the delays, which resulted from its
lack of diligence in monitoring the testing of the DNA evidence.233
Thus, the Glover court's decision wrongly validated the justification for
the delays resulting from unavailability of the DNA evidence. By ex-
cusing the State's prosecutorial indifference, the court further diluted
the right to a speedy trial in Maryland.
C. The Delays Due to the Unavailability of the DNA Evidence
Actually Prejudiced Glover
The Glover court misapplied the Barker balancing test with respect
to whether Glover suffered actual prejudice from the delays. In its
analysis, the court misapplied the circumstances of Glover's case to
the harms against which the speedy trial right is designed to guard. 23 4
By misconstruing the State's justifications for the delays, the court er-
roneously concluded that the record did not support any evidence
that the delays actually prejudiced Glover.23 5
The majority explained that Glover's pretrial incarceration was
not "inordinate or unduly oppressive" in light of the factual circum-
229. Id.
230. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38 (1970) (discussing a case in which the State failed
to bring a defendant to trial for eight years even though the defendant was available to the
State for the entire period).
231. Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 267, 434 A.2d 574, 577 (1981) (discussing a case in
which the State failed to prosecute a defendant over a period of fourteen months due to its
negligence in locating the defendant).
232. Glover, 368 Md. at 226-28, 792 A.2d at 1170-71.
233. Id. at 227-28, 792 A.2d at 1170.
234. Id. at 229, 792 A.2d at 1171. The right to a speedy trial protects against "oppressive
pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and impairment of the ac-
cused's defense." Id.
235. Id. at 231, 792 A.2d at 1172.
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stances relating to the unavailability of DNA evidence. 23 6 The court
explained that both parties had an important stake in obtaining com-
plete and accurate DNA test results.237 The court reasoned that DNA
test results could be exculpatory and, therefore, Glover had an equally
strong interest in waiting for them.238
The court's reasoning, however, is flawed because Glover was not
on a "quest" to obtain DNA evidence. 239 In fact, Glover spent an addi-
tional nine months in jail because of delays resulting from the prose-
cution's lack of diligence in preparing their DNA evidence for trial.24 °
During his time in prison, Glover was "very anxious and concerned" as
he had lost his home in the intervening months.241 The additional
time Glover spent in jail as a result of the State's failure to produce
the DNA test results rebuts the court's finding that Glover's pretrial
incarceration was not unduly oppressive.242
In addition, the court failed to recognize that the State's failure
to turn over the DNA results in a timely manner was prejudicial to
Glover's defense.2 43 At the December 23 hearing on the prosecu-
tion's failure to comply with the DNA discovery requirements, the trial
court stated that suppression of the DNA evidence would be too dras-
tic a remedy.2 4 4 Consequently, the trial judge postponed the trial un-
til July 17, 2000, nearly a year from the originally scheduled trial
date. 45 At that time, Glover's counsel expressed that he did not want
to postpone the trial a third time. 246 As a result, Glover was forced to
either acquiesce to the delay in order to confront the prosecution's
DNA evidence or proceed to trial without adequately analyzing the
DNA test results. 24 7 By forcing Glover to choose between preparing
236. See id. at 229, 792 A.2d at 1171 (concluding that Glover did not suffer prejudice as
the delay was due to neutral reasons).
237. Id,
238. See id. (reasoning that Glover had a stake in the outcome of the DNA test results).
239. See id, Glover's attorney, in fact, sought to suppress the DNA evidence at a hearing
on December 23, 1999, after the State failed to comply with the DNA discovery require-
ments for the second time. Id. at 217, 792 A.2d at 1163-64.
240. Id. at 229, 792 A.2d at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. Id. at 230, 792 A.2d at 1171.
242. Id. at 232, 792 A.2d at 1172. The Court of Appeals has previously acknowledged
that actual prejudice "may be presumed from the inordinate length of the delay itself."
Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 119, 345 A.2d 62, 77 (1975). Additionally, the Supreme Court in
Barker recognized that pretrial incarceration has a detrimental impact upon the defendant,
which actually prejudices the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972).
243. Glover, 368 Md. at 218-19, 792 A.2d at 1164.
244. Id at 217, 792 A.2d at 1164.
245. Id. at 218, 792 A.2d at 1164.
246. Id. at 217, 792 A.2d at 1164.
247. Id
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an adequate defense or continuing his pretrial incarceration in order
to counter the prosecution's evidence, the State created an inherently
unfair situation that ultimately prejudiced Glover.
The Glover court's conclusion that "no evidence on the record
established prejudice" resulted from its misapplication of the Barker
test.2 48 The court incorrectly found that the delays were justified be-
cause of the State and Glover's mutual quest for the DNA test re-
SUitS. 249 In addition, the court failed to weigh the prejudice factor in
Glover's favor during the balancing portion of the Barker test.250 As a
result, the Glover court weakened the right to a speedy trial in
Maryland.251
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Glover failed to successfully interpret and apply the
Supreme Court's analysis in Barker to the delays caused by the unavail-
ability of both DNA evidence and judges at the time of trial. Specifi-
cally, the majority failed to acknowledge the significance of the
cumulative delay in its balancing of the four Barker factors.252 In de-
termining that the inability to provide ajudge for trial was a "neutral"
justification, the court's decision diluted the State's duty to promptly
try a defendant.253 In addition, the court failed to acknowledge that
the State's failure to provide the defendant with the DNA evidence in
a timely manner was sufficiently prejudicial because it required Glover
to spend additional time in jail while waiting to prepare an adequate
defense. 254 The court's opinion excused prosecutorial indifference
and neglect for cases involving complex evidence such as DNA. Fur-
ther, the court departed from precedent by removing any weight ac-
corded to the defendant from unintentional delays caused by the
State. 2 As a result, barring intentional trial postponement, holding
individuals accused of crimes for presumptively prejudicial periods of
time is less likely to violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial.
248. Id. at 232, 792 A.2d at 1172.
249. Id.
250. Id
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Barker).
253. Glover, 368 Md. at 226-27, 792 A.2d at 1169.
254. Id. at 216-17, 792 A.2d at 1163-64.
255. SeeDiwerv. State, 356 Md. 379, 391-92, 739 A.2d 71, 78 (1999) (finding that a delay
of one year and sixteen days, resulting from the State's negligence in scheduling the defen-
dant's trial, violated the defendant's right to a speedy trial).
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Thus, the Glover court's failure to properly apply and interpret the
Barker balancing test resulted in an opinion that weakened the right to
a speedy trial in Maryland.
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